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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the effect of the forms of ownership on the substitutability between internal 
and external sources of finance. In particular, we test whether financial constraints are more 
severe for independent firms and whether there are differences between members of large 
national business groups and subsidiaries o f foreign multinational corporations. The results 
obtained from leverage and investment equations estimated for a panel of Italian companies imply 
that independent firms face greater capital market imperfections. Members o f national groups and 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations do not dispaly excess sensitivity to cash flow in their 
investment decisions. The leverage equations suggest however that there are interesting 
differences between the two latter categories of firms.
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1. Introduction
Italian private firms can be classified, in terms of form of ownership, either as independent 
firms or as members of larger organizations, such as national business groups or foreign 
multinational corporations. Business groups are a pervasive form of organization in several 
countries. They exist in a variety of types, ranging from hierarchical groups with a pyramidal 
structure to associative groups pursuing their common interest through a more informal system of 
coordinated decision making. In this paper we plan to analyze the role of group membership in 
alleviating capital market imperfections faced by firms in Italy. In this perspective, business 
groups and indeed multinational corporations, can be seen as organizational forms that allow a 
mitigation of the information and contract enforcement problems that arise in accessing external 
financial resources. On the one hand, business groups allow the formation of an internal capital 
market that may replace in part the capital allocation function of the external market. A group can 
pool funds from different affiliates and reallocate them to more profitable uses.' On the other hand 
business groups may improve the access to the external capital markets. In some countries (e.g. 
Japan and Germany) groups are linked organically with banks that play an imporant role in 
financing, monitoring, and coordinating activities o f member firms. The association with banks 
can be seen as another way to minimize information problems and to align more closely the 
incentive of borrowers and lenders. Multinational corporations play a similar role in creating an 
internal capital market and in facilitating the access to external funds for subsidiaries. They are 
indeed very likely to benefit from the financial strength, reputation, geographical and (often) 
product diversification ofthe parent company.
In Italy most private firms are owned and controlled by families. Sometimes the control is 
exercised on several separate companies through complex pyramidal organizational structures 
(hierarchical business groups) that allow a retention o f control rights, at the same time minimizing 
financial requirements.1 2 Still controlling coalitions tend to own a large fraction ofthe shares ofthe 
company. National groups operate in a context of underdeveloped capital markets, in which bank 
loans are the most common form of external finance. Contrary to the experience o f other
1 Williamson (1975) discusses this issue in the context of conglomerates.
2 In the early eighties new groups were set up and existing groups were expanded by splitting 
single companies in several legally independent units because of fiscal benefits.
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bank-based countries , such as Japan and Germany, the role of banks in equity financing is 
marginal and it is not very common for bankers to sit on the boards of directors of industrial firms 
or to play an active role in influencing industrial firms' strategic decisions. It is however true that, 
partly for historical reasons, large business groups have special informal relations with national 
financial institutions. Some ofthem are considered to play an important role not only in financing 
but also in acting as exclusive clubs where mutual shareholdings are organized and, more 
generally, decisions on corporate control are taken.3
It is common wisdom in Italy that members of large national business groups are likely to 
face more favorable lending practises than independent firms. The existence of these informal 
links, together with the more diversified nature of business groups is perceived as a distinctive 
advantage in obtaining external funds for affiliated firms. Moreover, most firms quoted at the 
national stock market are members ofthe largest business groups, this possibly enhancing the gap 
in accessing external markets between independent and affiliated firms. Subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational corporations are also likely to enjoy favorable relations with domestic banking 
institutions, although perhaps not as good as affiliates to large national groups . Moreover they 
have a distinctive advantage in tapping, directly or indirectly through the parent company, 
international capital markets.
No systematic investigation has been conducted so far on the effect o f the form of 
ownership on the substitutability between internal and external finance. The purpose ofthis paper 
is to fill this gap and to test whether financial constraints are more severe for independent firms 
relative to affiliated firms, and whether there are differences between members o f national groups 
and subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations. One standard approach to assessing the 
substitutability of internal and external sources has been to investigate the excess sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow for different categories of firms.4 In our paper we address this issue by 
investigating the role o f cash flow both in leverage and investment equations. The advantage of
3 Mediobanca, by far the most important investment bank in Italy, is defined by the economic 
press as the "salon of italian capitalism".
4 See Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) for a seminal contribution in this area. See also 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) for an analysis ofthe implications of group membership in 
Japan.
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this approach is two fold. First, the effect ofthe availability of internal finance on capital structure 
decisions contains important information on the degree of subsitutability between different 
sources of funds that should be exploited. Second, the joint empirical analysis on both decisions 
acts a severe consistency check on the conclusions one reaches on the existence and severity of 
financial constraints for different firms.
In our empirical work we make use o f a novel dataset of Italian firms built at Ceris by 
merging balance sheet information on firms, published yearly by Mediobanca, with qualitative 
information on firms' control structure taken directly from company reports that allows us to 
classify firms as: members of a national business group, or subsidiaries of a foreign multinational 
corporation, or other national firms. Section 2 ofthe paper discusses the nature ofthe dataset 
and summarizes the relevant descriptive statistics. Section 3 and 4 represent the core ofthe paper. 
In particular, section 3 presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of firms' leverage 
decisions, whereas in section 4 the effects of financial variables on fixed investment are tested. 
Concluding remarks are provided in section 5.
2. Descriptive Statistics on Cash Flow and Financial Debt
In this section we provide both a brief description ofthe unbalanced sample of firms used 
in this paper and some descriptive evidence on the evolution ofthe financial variables which are 
used in the econometric exercises discussed in the following sections. Real and financial data are 
available for 1229 firms over the period 1977-1990. The number o f consecutive observations for 
each firm ranges from a maximum of 14 to a minimum of 1 . As far as firm's form of ownership is 
concerned, in each year firms are allocated to one of these categories: members of large national 
business groups, foreign subsidiaries, or other national firms.5 Firms are classified as affiliates of 
large national groups if they are controlled ,directly or indirectly, in the relevant year by the 
following 18 groups: Agnelli - Fiat, De Benedetti - Cir, Ferruzzi - Montedison, Fininvest - 
Mondadori, Pesenti Italmobiliare, Pirelli, Barilla, Benetton, Cartiere Burgo, Falck, Ferrero, 
Gft, Lucchini, Marzotto, Merloni, Parmalat, Miroglio, and Smi. These groups represented the 
'core' ofthe private national industrial sector in the eighties and most ofthem have been ranked in
5 See the Data Appendix for additional information. In the econometric estimates firms with 
less than 4 consectutive observations have been excluded.
4
"'If-,, ! i •
I \ \ \
S \ ■ > ’
»
■
-
.
the top positions in terms of size since the first incomplete list of groups was published by 
Mediobanca in 1983. Furthermore, these groups are the only private groups with a consolidated 
turnover greater than 1,000 billion Lira in 1990. Firms are classified as foreign subsidiaries if the 
parent company is foreign. Finally, firms are classified as other national firms when they do not 
satisfy the requirements to be included in the first two categories. This category contains mainly 
independent companies but firms affiliated to smaller, and perhaps younger, business groups are 
also included. We have grouped these two types of firms together for two reasons. First, 
information on the organizational structure of the smaller business groups is not very rich 
(expecially in the first years of our sample period) and the decision to allocate or not some firms 
to a given business group (expecially in the case of indirect control) would have been rather 
arbitrary. Second, the smaller business groups are more similar to the independent firms in our 
sample than to the large business groups in terms ofsize and diversification.
As can be seen from Table 1, out of a total o f7633 firm-year observations, 1489 pertain to 
large national groups, 2462 to subsidiaries of multinationals and 3682 to firms not associated with 
either. The average number of employees is 1127 (1044 after excluding firms with less than 4 
consecutive observations). However, this figure hides significant differences among our three 
sub-samples. In fact, the average size of firms that are members of large national business groups 
(2603 or 23 50 employees, depending on the sample used) is much bigger than the average size of 
subsidiaries o f multinationals (1057 or 1024 employees) and of other domestic companies (577 
or 561 employees).
In the descriptive analysis that follows, we discuss the evolution of cash flow and 
indebtedness for the firms in each of the three categories. For both variables we compute and plot 
the median (Q2),the first decile (D l), the first quartile (Q l), the third quartile (Q3) and the ninth 
decile (D9).6
We start our analysis by focusing on the dynamics o f internal finance over time. Pre­
dividend cash flow divided by total assets, (computed as the sum ofthe replacement value of fixed
6 The figures that follow are obtained using the fully unbalanced dataset. In order to check that 
our descriptive evidence is not contaminated by changes in the sample composition we have also 
calculated the percentiles for a balanced sample of firms. The results are very similar and are not 
reported here.
______________ Ceris-CNR , W P. N° 1/1995
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assets and ofthe accounting value of gross working capital) is used as a proxi for internal finance.7 
In Figures la  to lc percentiles are plotted for the sub-samples of members of large national 
business groups, affiliates to foreign multinationals, and other national firms respectively. The 
data show that internal finance moves procyclically for all firms. It declines in the 1981-82 
recessionary period that follows the second oil shock and the tightening ofmonetary policy. Then, 
following the economic recovery which started in 1983 we observe a steady increase in internal 
finance up to 1987. Finally, cash flow declines again in the most recent years, partly anticipating 
the recession that occurred at the beginning ofthe nineties. The comparison between our three 
figures does not suggest any striking difference both in the dynamics and in the levels o f cash 
flow, even if firms affiliated to large national business groups seem on the whole less profitable 
than the others (this is particularly true for the lower tail ofthe distribution). The fact that firms 
that do not belong to national or foreign groups are not less profitable than the other firms in the 
sample is a useful result since it suggests that differences that we may discover in their leverage 
and investment choices are not due to independent firms' poor economic performances.
Figures 2a to 2c highlight some interesting aspects ofthe dynamics o f total financial debt 
divided by total assets for the three sub-samples of companies. Given the nature ofthe data, we 
cannot distinguish for affiliated firms the portion of debt obtained from the parent company or 
from other members of the group. In a sense this is not fundamental for the object o f our 
investigation. In fact belonging to a group relaxes financial constraints for member firms both 
because it creates an internal capital market and because it makes the access to external funds 
easier. Moreover, more finely disaggregated data for a sample of 779 large private firms provided 
by Mediobanca, suggests that intra-group financial debt represents an average of 13.2 %, so that 
debt external to the group constitutes the bulk of financial debt.8
7 Pre-dividend cash flow is computed by subtracting the sum of total labor costs, interests 
charged and taxes from added value. Since we compute our measure of cash flow by subtracting 
nominal interests, it incorporates the component of interests which represents an advance on loan 
repayment. Since the data set does not contain information on dividend payments, we cannot 
calculate retentions.
8 See Mediobanca, Dati Cumulativi di 1790 Società Italiane (1992). Transfer o f financial 
resources between associated firms could also occur through transfer prices. However there is no
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From a look at Figure 2 it is apparent that both members of large national business groups and 
other domestic companies are characterized by a higher leverage compared to the sub-sample of 
affiliates to foreign multinationals. There are two interesting differences in the dynamics of 
leverage that distinguishes non-affiliated firms. First, we observe at the beginning of the 1981 -82 
recession an increase of leverage for the median firm ofthe sample o f members of large national 
groups. Such an increase occurs for foreign subsidiaries (below the 3rd quartile), as well, but 
does not occur for non-affiliated firms. This suggests that, in the face of monetary tightening and 
recession, member firms can make up the shartfall in cash flow with access to external funds and it 
is consistent with the flight to quality hypothesis (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1992), 
whereby in bad times investors concentrate their funding on those firms with lower agency costs 
due to asymmetric information and contract enforcenment problems. Affiliated firms, with low 
debt are prime candidates for external funding. Second, following the recovery (1983-88), we 
observe a steady decline in leverage for affiliates to national groups and also for subsidiaries of 
foreign multinationals whereas this trend is much less pronounced or absent in the sample of 
independent firms. A possible explanation for this finding is that affiliated firms were able to issue 
new shares in the years of recovery, which were used partly to repay debt. Unfortunately our 
dataset does not contain information on new share issues. Another possible explanation is that the 
degree of centralization of financial management increased in business groups over the eighties, 
possibly inducing a reduction in the level ofdebt ofaffiliated companies.
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3. Econometric Evidence on the Relation between Internal and External Finance from 
Leverage Equations
In the presence of asymmetric information between insiders and outside investors and 
contract enforcement problems, internal and external finance are not perfect substitutes in the 
sense that firms will have to pay a premium to obtain outside funds or, in some cases, they may be 
completely rationed. Abstracting from tax considerations, firms will have a preference to finance 
investment internally, then with debt. Only as debt becomes riskier, will firms finally issue equity. 
This is what Myers (1984) calls the "pecking order" theory of financing.* 9 Given this argument we
way to quantify the importance ofthis channel.
9 See also Myers and Majluf (1984).
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would expect, given investment opportunities, a negative association between debt and internal 
finance. Moreover, the change in debt will less than compensate for the change in internal funds. 
Since asymmetric information and contract enforcement problems are unlikely to be uniformally 
distributed across firms, the degree o f substitutability between internal and external sources is 
expected to vary across firms. In the context of a leverage equation this means that we would 
expect a negative and larger in absolute value coefficient on cash flow ( used here as a proxy for 
internal finance) for firms less affected by capital market imperfections problems. Finally, it is also 
possible that the severity of these problems varies over the business cycle, being more acute in bad 
times.
However, matters are more complicated than that. First, a change in cash flow, if it is at 
least partly observed by outside investors, can lead to a revised valuation ofcollateralizable assets. 
For instance a positive cash flow shock could increase their value and lead to a decreased premium 
on debt. Second, a change in cash flow may change expectations on future profitability and shift 
the demand for funds schedule. Both these effects may weaken or even reverse the negative 
association between cash flow and leverage. It has also been suggested (Jensen and Meckling,
1976) that debt helps in mitigating the conflict that arises between managers and shareholders due 
to the fact that the former bear the cost but do not capture the entire gain from profit enhancement 
activities. In this situation managers may have an incentive in consuming perks and invest less 
efforts in managing firm's activities. Jensen (1986) suggests that debt constitutes a commitment to 
pay out cash, limits managers' discretionality, and reduces the agency costs associated to the 
managers-shareholders conflict (the "free cash flow" hypothesis). Also for this reason, one may 
observe a positive association between cash flow and leverage (when cash flow is high the benefits 
of debt are also high), for given investment opportunities. However, this last argument is unlikely 
to be important for independent Italian firms. Not only most companies are not quoted but top 
management positions are very often filled by members of the family owning the company. This 
problem is likely to be more severe for large national business groups and, particularly, for 
foreign multinationals. It is in fact in these larger organizations where the standard agency 
problems between shareholders and managers are more likely to occur. However, the fact that 
controlling coalitions in domestic business groups usually hold a large fraction of shares (which 
mitigates the conflict somewhat) suggests that the problem is probably greater for subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations that tend to have a more diffuse ownership structure.
8
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In the light o f the above discussion the relationship between cash flow and financial debt 
is essentially an empirical matter. Summarizing, asymmetric information considerations would 
lead to a negative relationship, given the state of expectations and the severity o f  agency problems 
between managers and shareholders. The negative association should be stronger the closer the 
substitutability between internal and external sources. In the absence of managers - shareholders 
agency problems, we can test for cross firms differences in substitutability by estimating the 
leverage equation separately for firms that are expected to suffer less (affiliated firms) and more 
(independent firms) from information problems. Although expectational considerations may 
mitigate or reverse the negative relationship between debt and cash flow, there is no obvious 
reason why this importance should vary systematically across firms. However, as already 
mentioned, it is possible that differences in the cash flow coefficient may reflect the agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. Since such problems are likely to be more 
important when cash flow increases than when cash flow decreases, we will allow the cash flow 
coefficient to differ, depending which ofthese two cases occurs. The coefficient is more likely to 
be negative when cash flow decreases because in this case the pecking order argument probably 
dominates. Note that if we find in this case a coefficient which is negative and larger in absolute 
value for firms that are group members or subsidiaries of multinationals, that is a clear indication 
that there is greater substitutability between internal and external finance sources of finance for 
those firms, compared to non-affiliated firms. Agency problems between managers and 
shareholders are, in fact, more important for affiliates to national or, even more so, foreign groups 
than for independent firms. This would tend to make the cash flow coefficients less negative.
In this section we provide some econometric evidence on the relation between internal 
finance and firm's capital structure.10 We use the following estimation strategy. As benchmark, 
we start from a very simple leverage equation where the ratio between total financial debt and 
total assets, (B/K) is explained in terms of the lagged dependent variable, (B/K)^, the ratio 
between cash flow and total assets, (C/K)(, and the contemporary and once lagged changes in real
10 The empirical literature on the determination o f capital structure is vast. See for instance 
Titman and Wessel (1988) and the extensive references in Harris and Raviv (1991) for the US. 
There are few papers on Italy with the exceptions of Bonato and Faini (1990), and Faini, Galli and 
Giannini (1991 ). A good survey on both theoretical and institutional aspects in the Italian context 
is Bonato,HamauiandRatti(1993).
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sales, dlogY and dlogY . Using appropriate firm type dummies, all the coefficients are allowed to 
differ between affiliates to large national groups, foreign multinationals and independent firms. 
We then interact (C/K) with a dummy variable, D which equals one if the ratio between cash flow 
and total assets increases between time t-1 and t, and zero otherwise.
In order to eliminate time invariant firm specific characteristics that affect capital 
structure choices we estimate all the equations in first differences. In order to allow for the 
endogeneity ofthe regressors, estimation is carried out by the Generalized Method of Moments 
technique, using appropriately lagged variables as instruments. Cash flow and sales growth are 
likely to be correlated with the error term, as well as the dummy variables used to define the 
regime of increasing (decreasing) cash flow. Assuming that the idiosyncratic component ofthe 
error is serially uncorrelated in the level equations, this will generate an error with a moving 
average structure of order one in the equations in differences. Therefore also once lagged 
variables are correlated with the error term. However, values ofthe regressors lagged twice or 
more will be legitimate instruments. In order to check the validity ofthe assumptions imbedded in 
our model we calculate and report tests on both first (M ) and second order (M^) correlation on 
the residuals as well as the Hansen/Sargan test on the correlation ofthe instruments with the 
error term as a general test of mispecification. In all the equations we also include three sets of 
year dummies (one for each sub-sample of firms) , to allow for time effects common to each 
group of firms. Year dummies can be thought to capture, among other things, changes in 
expectations about demand or changes in the interest rate common to all firms in each sub­
sample.
In the specification that does not allow for asymmetry on the cash flow term (Table 2) the 
coefficient on cash flow is negative and significant only for the sub-sample o f firms affiliated to 
large national business groups, suggesting a higher degree o f substitutability between external 
and internal finance for this type of firms." The coefficient is instead positive and insignificant for 
other national firms, indicating a lesser degree of substitutability between internal and external 
finance. Foreign subsidiaries represent an intermediate case: the coefficient is negative, but small 
and insignificant. This is consistent with the existence o f agency problems between managers and 1
11 The cash flow coefficient for affiliated firms is significantly different at the conventional 
statistical level from those for both multinationals and independent firms, (t statistics on the 
differences are equal to 4.34 and 4.84 respectively).
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shareholders (more light on this issue will be shed by the results in Table 3). The coefficient on the 
past level of leverage is positive and less than one for all the sub-samples of firms. This implies that 
the change in the debt to capital ratio is negatively related to the initial degree of leverage, as one 
would expect since more highly indebted firms face greater risks of bankruptcy and possibly 
greater agency problems. The overall effect o f firm's growth rate is negative for subsidiaries of 
foreign multinationals and positive for the other two sub-samples of firms. A negative sign is 
likely to capture the fact that the potential for managers to invest in value decreasing projects is 
greater when there are growth opportunities. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that this 
particular agency problem is more severe for foreign multinationals than for nationally owned 
firms. This is certainly true in the case of non-affiliated firms where management and ownership 
basically coincide,but it is also true (relative to foreign subsidiaries) for members oflarge national 
groups, As a result, the role of sales growth in capturing greater actual investment and hence a 
greater need for finance dominates in these cases.
In Table 3, the cash flow coefficient is allowed to differ depending whether cash flow 
increases (D =1) or decreases (D =0). The coefficients on cash flow are negative and significant in
t t
both regimes for the sub sample of affiliates to large national groups and do not differ from zero 
for the other national firms, thus confirming the results reported in Table 2. For the subsidiaries of 
foreign multinationals the coefficient on cash flow is positive and significant in the regime of 
increasing cash flow but negative and significant in the regime of decreasing cash flow '2, although 
smaller in absolute value than for firms affiliated to national groups. This indicates that despite the 
fact that a decrease in cash flow could signal bad news about future profitability, foreign 
multinationals are able to substitute internal finance with external finance when cash flow falls 
(although, perhaps, not as easily as national groups). Note also that free cash flow considerations 
are weaker when cash flow decreases, so that its coefficient in this case is more likely to capture 
the degree o f substitutability. The positive coefficient for foreign subsidiaries, when cash flow 
increases, is consistent with the greater importance in that case of the agency problems outlined 
in the "free cash flow" hypothesis. Interestingly, non-affiliated firms cannot substitute external for 12
12 Despite sizable differences, in the regime of decreasing cash flow we cannot reject the 
hypothesis o f equality between the coefficients on cash flow for affiliates to national large groups 
and for foreign multinationals (t= 1.64). Both coefficients differ significantly from that for 
independent firms (t=  5.70 andt=3.74 respectively).
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internal finance when the latter decreases. All this is consistent with the idea that belonging to 
national or foreign groups mitigates capital market imperfections for member firms in bad times 
and, perhaps, allows them to have better access to external funds. Such access is instead more 
restricted or costly for independent firms.
4. Econometric Evidence on the Effects of Financial Factors on Investment
In the previous section we found evidence that is consistent with the idea that external 
finance is a very imperfect substitute for internal finance for independent firms while the degree 
o f substitutability is higher for affiliated firms. The next step is to test whether imperfect 
substitutability has an impact on firms' real policies. We estimate a simple accelerator model of 
company investment13, with the ratio of cash flow to fixed capital stock, (C/KF)( and the ratio of 
total debt to fixed capital stock, (B/KF) as additional regressors. As suggested by Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) differences in the size o f the cash flow coefficients provide 
information on the importance of liquidity constraints. This approach has been applied to the 
effects of group membership in Japan by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991 ).They found that 
firms that are members ofan industrial/financial group are less sensitive to cash flow fluctuations
Obviously, a significant positive cash flow effect on investment does not necessarily 
reflect the presence o f financing constraints but it may simply depend on the fact that cash flow 
conveys information on expected profitability. However, as already mentioned, we minimize the 
risk o f misinterpreting our empirical results, by focusing on differences in the coefficients on cash 
flow among sub-samples of firms. In this case, if differences are found it is rather implausible to 
attribute them to differences in expectations formation.14
As in the previous section, all estimates are carried out in first differences to eliminate firm 
specific characterisitics, using GMM estimation techniques to allow for the endogeneity of the
13 The importance ofcapital market imperfections on investment decisions has been analyzed for 
Italy in the context of the Euler equation approach in Galeotti, Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1994), 
and Rondi, Sembenelli and Zanetti (1994).
14 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1994) present evidence that the mechanism o f expectation 
formation does not differ significantly among US firms.
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regressors. In all the reported equations three sets of year dummies are included, to allow time 
specific effects to differ between the three sub-samples of firms.
We start from a specification which includes the lagged dependent variable, (I/KF) j , the 
contemporary and once lagged ratios between cash flow and fixed capital, and the contemporary 
and once lagged rates o f change in output (Table 4). The coefficients on contemporary cash flow 
are positive and significant for both affiliated and independent national firms. However, the 
coefficient is about twenty times larger for the sub-sample of independent firms (.4074 versus 
.0199). The coefficient on contemporary cash flow for the sub-sample of foreign multinationals is 
instead negative and significant, although fairly small (-.0649). The coefficient on lagged cash 
flow is positive for multinational firms (.0592) and negative for the sub-samples of affiliated and 
independent national firms (-.0130 and -.2042 respectively). The sum of the coefficients for 
independent firms is still about twenty times larger compared to affiliates to large national groups. 
This indicates that the availability of internal funds for firms that are either group members or 
subsidiaries o f foreign multinationals is less important for investment decisions, since 
membership makes it easier to tap the external capital market and, moreover, an internal capital 
market is created by the group. As expected, the coefficients on the rates of growth in sales are 
positive and significant in most cases. Interestingly the sales coefficients are larger for 
multinational firms, suggesting that they respond more strongly to demand stimula, whereas the 
point estimates for affiliated and independent national firms are remarkably similar.
To check the robustness o f previous results we rerun the equation in Table 4, after 
omitting the lagged cash flow variable (Table 5). The coefficients on cash flow for non-aflfiliated 
and affiliated national firms are both positive and significant but the former ten times bigger than 
the latter. The coefficient for multinationals does not differ significantly from zero. 15 We have 
performed other experiments by allowing more dynamics in our basic equation with the 
introduction o f twice lagged regressors for all the variables in the model. We do not report these 
results for reasons o f space. The basic conclusions do not change and, in any case, the coefficients
15 The cash flow coefficient for non-afifiliated firms is significantly different, at conventional 
levels, compared to to the ones for members of domestic business groups (t=8.15) and for foreign 
subsidiaries (t=8.60). The cash flow coefficient for foreign subsidiaries is also significantly 
different from that for affiliated national firms (t=5.82).
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on the additional lags do not differ significantly from zero. We also replaced the rates of change in 
output either with the levels of output or with the ratios between the change in output and fixed 
capital, and we have also added the rates of change in industry output. In all these alternative 
specifications our basic findings were not altered.
In Table 6, we expand our basic equation with the introduction ofthe ratio between total 
financial debt and fixed capital as a regressor. The economic rationale for adding this further 
variable is as follows: if the rate of interest is an increasing function of firm's leverage because of 
the existence of financial distress costs, higher leverages should lead to a greater premium on 
external finance and have a negative impact on investment. What is more important in our 
framework however, is that the coefficient should be more negative for those types of firms 
characterized by more severe asymmetric information or contract enforcement problems. The 
results we obtain are consistent with this hypothesis. In fact, the coefficient does not differ 
significantly from zero for subsidiaries of multinational firms whereas it is negative and 
significant for the other two sub-samples. However, the coefficient is extremely small for 
affiliated firms but large in absolute value and economically significant for non-affiliated firms.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we provide an integrated approach to the analysis of capital market 
imperfections at the firm level by analyzing the role of cash flow both in investment and in 
leverage equations. We apply our methodology to a large unbalanced panel of Italian private 
companies, categorized by form of ownership. We find strong empirical evidence from the 
leverage equations supporting the hypothesis that group membership alleviates capital market 
imperfections. Firms that are neither members of the largest national business groups nor 
subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations find more difficulties in substituting internal 
finance with external finance than affiliated firms. We also find evidence from the sales growth and 
cash flow coefficients that agency problems between managers and shareholders are more 
important for subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations than for affiliates of large national 
business groups. This is to be expected, given the fact that controlling coalitions in domestic 
groups usually hold a large fraction of shares, while multinational corporations tend to have a 
more diffuse ownership structure.
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The different degree of substitutability between cash flow and debt has implications on 
firms' real choices. In fact we find that investment decisions are much more sensitive to the 
availability o f cash flow in the sample of non-affiliated firms, confirming the crucial role that 
internal finance plays for them. The consistency of the results we obtained from the investment 
equations with those of the leverage equations is very important and lends credence to our general 
conclusions.
The overall pattern of results casts more than a passing doubt on the degree of success 
achieved by the national financial system in making external finance accessible to non-affiliated 
firms throughout the eighties. M oreover, it is also possible that our results actually underestimate 
the problem since firms that make our sample of non-affiliated companies represent the upper tail 
o f the size distribution o f the total population of non-affiliated firms and are less likely to face 
unfavorable lending practises than other even smaller firms. Finally, the evidence we have 
presented lend support to the idea that cycle shocks may have important distributional 
consequences across various types of firms, characterized in our case by different forms of 
ownership.
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Data Appendix
The primary source used to build the database is "Le Principali Società Italiane" directory, 
published yearly by Mediobanca. It contains condensed balance sheets and profits and loss 
accounts together with other information (number of employees, main industrial sector, etc.) for 
two consecutive years for a variable number of companies. In the first column of Table A. 1 the 
number o f companies available in each year is listed. The lower size limit for a firm to be included 
in the directory is 10 billion lire of sales in the 1977-1984 period, 20 billion lire in the 1985-86 
period, and 25 billion lire in the 1987-90 period. The number of observations for the whole period 
is 18,081 .As in each directory data are available only for two years, time series have been obtained 
by merging data coming from several editions of the Mediobanca directory. Firms' names have 
been used as the main variable in merging. Firms whose main activity is outside the manufacturing 
sector, State ownen firms, and manufacturing firms with less than 6 consecutive observations 
have been excluded from the sample. After these selections the number of observations was 
reduced to 8,298.The number of observations per year is reported in the third column of Table 
A .l.
Each firm has then been allocated to its primary activity as defined in the three-digits 
NACE-CLIO classification. This has been done by using the MEDIOBANCA classification, 
other available information and company reports. For each firm the stock of capital at replacement 
cost has been computed following the standard perpetual inventory technique. From Mediobanca 
directories it is also possible to know whether firms have been involved in mergers, acquisitions 
or other extraordinary operations in a given year. Since in this case balance sheet and profits and 
loss account data are unlikely to be comparable with data from either the previous or the 
following year, obvervations in years when an extraordinary operation occured are also excluded 
from the sample. The total number o f observations excluded for this reason is 607. Finally, after 
excluding observations with negative capital stock, we are left with an unbalanced panel of 7,633 
firm-observations and l,229firms (see last columnof Table A .l).
Tables A.2, A. 3 and A.4 give further information on the characteristics of the sample. In 
Table A.2 firms are ranked in descending order according to the number of consecutive 
observations. In Table A.3 observations are classified by industry, using the two-digit Nace Clio 
classification. Finally, in Table A.4 observations are classified by firm's form of ownership: 
affiliates o f large national groups, subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, other national firms.
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics on size (number of employees)
Full sample (7633 cases)
Mean Cases
Full sample 1127.0 7633
Members of large national
business groups 2602.9 1489
Foreign subsidiaries 1057.0 2462
Other national firms 577.0 3682
Only firms with more than 3 observations (6912 cases)
Mean Cases
Full sample - 1043.6 6912
Members of large national
business groups 2349.5 1278
Foreign subsidiaries 1023.9 2268
Other national firms 561.0 3366
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GMM estimates in first differences
Table 2 - Debt equation: basic model;
dependent variable: (B/K); sample period: 1980-1990;
Members o f  large national 
business groups
Foreign
subsidiaries
Other national 
firms
.3742 (0319) .4548 (0095) .4433 (  0372)
(C/K)( -.5579 (1034) -.0359 (0613) .0918 (0930)
d log Y .0257 (0230) -.1889 (0318) .0372 (0126)
d log Y
t-1
.0135 (0104) -.0049 (0089) -.0049 (0030)
M 1 -3.955 [763]
M
2
-0.933 [692]
Sargan 189.00 [177]
Footnotes:
(1) Instrument list: All included variables lagged twice and three times.
(2) Sub-sample specific time dummies included.
v'
GMM estimates in first differences
Table 3 - Debt equation: model with asymmetric effect of cash flow;
dependent variable: (B/K); sample period: 1980-1990;
Members o f  large national Foreign 
business groups subsidiaries
Other national 
firms
(B * )-, .3326 (.0265) .3972 (0115) .4138 (0325)
D(C/K)t t -.8576 (0855) .2592 (0653) .0954 (0901)
(l-D t)(C/K)t -.7028 (0967) -4680 (1121) -.0271 (0865)
d log Y .0036 (0184) -.2069 (0289) .0373 (0112)
d log Yt-1 .0202 (0088) .0074 (0090) -.0059 (0030)
M -4.658 [763]
M2 -.858 [692]
Sargan 236.39 [237]
Footnotes:
(1) D = 1 if (C/K) > (C/K) ; D = 0 otherwise.t t t-1 t
(2) Instrument list: All included variables lagged twice and three times.
(3) Sub-sample specific time dummies included.
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GMM estimates in first differences
Table 4 - Investment equation: basic model;
dependent variable: (I/KF); sample period: 1980-1990;
Members o f large national 
business groups
Foreign
subsidiaries
Other national 
firms
.0058 (0003) .2685 (0146) .0639 (.0155)
(C/Kf)( .0199 (.0003) -.0649 (0077) .4074 (.0349)
(C/Kf)
M l
-.0130 (0003) .0592 (0013) -.2042 (.0222)
d log Y .0252 (0230) .1509 (0349) .0300 (.0099)
d log Y
t-1
.0016 (0086) .0176 (.0092) .0019 (.0037)
M
1
-6.040 [763]
M
2
-0.885 [692]
Sargan 185.60 [174]
Footnotes:
(1) Instrument list: All included variables lagged twice and three times.
(2) Sub-sample specific time dummies included.
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Table 5 - Investment equation: basic model 
without lagged cash flow; dependent variable: (I/KF) ;
t
sample period: 1980-1990; GMM estimates in first differences
Members o f  large national Foreign Other national
business groups subsidiaries firms
(I/Kf)
t-1
.0054 ( 0004) .2505 ( 0157) .0428 ( 0148)
(C/KF)( .0277 ( 0003) -.0014 ( 0055) .2619 ( 0302)
(C/Kf)
t-1
- - -
dlogY .0522 ( 0228) .1049 ( 0239) .0180 ( 0144)
dlog Y .0052 ( 0078) .0185 ( 0083) -.0021 ( 0042)
M 1 -4.239 [763]
M
2
-0.779 [692]
Sargan 194.21 [177]
Footnotes:
(1) Instrument list: All included variables lagged twice and three times.
(2) Sub-sample specific time dummies included.
m m
GMM estimates in first differences
Table 6 - Investment equation: model with debt;
dependent variable: (I/KF); sample period: 1980-1990;
Members o f large national 
business groups
Foreign
subsidiaries
Other national 
firms
W . % . 0 0 5 5  (0003) . 2 2 9 6  (0118) . 0 2 7 6  (0135)
( C / K F ) ( . 0 2 0 6  (.0002) . 0 0 8 9  (0046) . 3 0 8 1  (0244)
(C/Kf)
t-1
- - -
dlogY . 0 0 4 3  (0130) . 0 8 5 2  (0165) . 0 0 7 9  (0123)
dlog Y
t-1
. 0 0 1 4  (  0069) . 0 1 4 5  (0076) - . 0 0 4 6  (0046)
(B/Kf)( - . 0 0 0 3  (0000) . 0 0 0 3  (0004) - . 0 2 9 1  (0054)
M
1
- 4 . 4 0 4  [ 7 6 3 ]
M
2
- 0 . 7 7 6  [ 6 9 2 ]
Sargan 2 5 1 . 1 4  [ 2 3 7 ]
Footnotes:
(1) Instrument list: All included variables lagged twice and three times.
(2) Sub-sample specific time dummies included.

Table A .l - Number of observations by year
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (0
1977 858 445 368 0 24 344
1978 862 447 370 1 19 350
1979 948 512 426 12 8 406
1980 1091 599 507 62 5 440
1981 1100 652 558 85 1 472
1982 1127 714 611 41 1 569
1983 1182 757 655 36 1 619
1984 1241 791 687 65 0 622
1985 1342 867 765 51 0 714
1986 1486 836 744 43 0 701
1987 1535 784 702 56 0 646
1988 1655 755 675 49 0 626
1989 1779 716 640 61 0 579
1990 1875 655 590 45 0 545
18081 9530 8298 607 59 7633
(a) Number of observations in original files
(b) Number of observations after excluding non-manufacturing firms and manu 
facturing firms with less than 6 consecutive observations
(c) Number of observations after excluding state-owned firms from (b)
(d) Extraordinary operation cases
(e) Negative capital stock cases
(f) Number of observations after excluding (d) and (e) from (c)
\* \
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Table A.2 - Number of firms by years of observation
Years of Observation Number of Firms
14 77
13 17
12 40
11 57
10 56
9 78
8 101
7 89
6 177
5 71
4 99
3 123
2 108
1 136

Table A.3 - Total number of observations by industry (Nace-Clio 2 digits)
Nace Code Cases
22 Production and preliminary processing of metals 410
24 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 517
25 Chemical Industry 1129
26 Man-made fibres industry 78
31 Manufacture of metal articles 406
32 Mechanical Engineering 842
33 Manufacture of office machinery and data processing machinery 46
34 Electrical engineering 873
35 Manufacture of motor vehicles and of motor vehicle parts 256
36 Manufacture of other means of transport 152
37 Instrument Engineering 123
41/42 Food, drink and tobacco industry 1042
43 Textile industry 533
44 Leather and leather goods industry 17
45 Footwear and clothing industry 280
46 Timber and wooden furniture industries 67
47 Manufactuer of paper and paper products; printing and publishing 519
48 Processing of rubber and plastics 264
49 Other manufacturing industries 79
7633
It ,  ' - y ^ fì,
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1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Total
Table A.4 - Number of observations by type of ownership
Members o f  Foreign Other Total
national large subsidiaries national
business groups Jii-ms
80 107 157 344
80 108 162 350
96 122 188 406
92 139 209 440
97 146 229 472
122 178 269 569
140 190 289 619
134 204 284 622
132 232 350 714
128 225 348 701
110 217 319 646
104 213 309 626
89 195 295 579
85 186 274 545
1489 2462 3682 7633
-'
Figure 1 - Pre dividend cash flow/total capital at replacement value: C/K
Fig. 1a - Affiliates to large national business groups
\
Fig. 2a - Affiliates to large national business groups
Figure 2 - Total financial debt/total capital at replacement value: B/K
Fig. 2c - Other national firms
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